What was actually happening vs what was military intelligence reporting in the Vietnam war?

Has anyone read John Newman's "JFK and Vietnam" or is very knowledgeable about the topic especially the differences between what was actually happening on the battlefield and what military intelligence was reporting? Especially in relation to the years '61, '62, '63 and the last half of '67. Any information would be appreciated greatly.What was actually happening vs what was military intelligence reporting in the Vietnam war?I haven't read Newman's book, but I have a general idea of what was happening.



Military Intelligence (and much of the military hierarchy) was judging Vietnam by conventional war standards. In a 'conventional war', victory is determined by which side kills/wounds/captures more in battle, controls major geographical locations (ie cities), and possession of a battle field after a major engagement. It was the general belief that if you could inflict casualties in at least a 1:8 ratio (for every soldier of yours lost you eliminate 8 of the enemy) that victory would be ensured.



Throughout the war, US forces regularly inflicted significant losses on Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces while suffering minimal loses in comparison. During the Tet Offensive I believe that the casualty ratio was 1:10 or 1:11. US forces were able to hold battle ground in major engagements, driving off Vietnamese forces with superior firepower. From a statistical point of view, Vietnam could not continue to wage a war for a sustained amount of time while sustaining this level of damage.



What the Intelligence Services didn't account for was the changing nature of warfare. The Vietnamese didn't supply their armies from within their own borders. A majority of Vietnamese supplies came from Russia, with a not insignificant contribution from China. There was no way to control Vietnam's ability to arm troops by restricting the means of production as occurred to the Confederate States of America, France during the Napoleonic Wars, Germany and Japan during WWII, etc. No matter what victories American troops won, Vietnamese soldiers would be able to rearm and reequip.



Another major flaw was the strategy of war changed in Vietnam. There was no front, no rear area. American troops would leave fortresses akin to medieval castles, 'pacify' an area, and then return to their castle. Vietnamese forces would often give ground to large scale American operations while organizing attacks on smaller outposts, patrols, and forces. If you examine the statistics of small unit actions, the casualty ratio becomes much more balances.



Finally Military Intelligence failed to account for the change in perceived value of an American life. During WWII, Americans 'understood what we are fighting for', and were willing to accept casualties in large numbers. The press wouldn't report the death of one or two soldiers who were on patrol, but rather the 200 lost in the Battle of Hill 1029. During Vietnam, Americans weren't willing to tolerate mass causalities. The ability and willingness of the press to quickly relay casualty reports was much higher. The perception was that Americans were dying at rates comparable to WWII. Therefore war weariness increased at a much higher rate in Vietnam than WWII. As opposition to the war grew, it became possible for American troops to achieve an overwhelming victory but have it perceived as a defeat by the American public.



Hope this helped.